Abstract-Android is an operating system that has been used in a majority of mobile devices. Each application in Android runs in an instance of the Dalvik virtual machine, which is a register-based virtual machine (VM). Most applications for Android are developed using Java, compiled to Java bytecode and then translated to DEX bytecode using the dx tool in the Android SDK. In this work, we aim to develop a typebased method for certifying non-interference properties of DEX bytecode, following a methodology that has been developed for Java bytecode certification by Barthe et al. To this end, we develop a formal operational semantics of the Dalvik VM, a type system for DEX bytecode, and prove the soundness of the type system with respect to a notion of non-interference. We then study the translation process from Java bytecode to DEX bytecode, as implemented in the dx tool in the Android SDK. We show that an abstracted version of the translation from Java bytecode to DEX bytecode preserves the non-interference property. More precisely, we show that if the Java bytecode is typable in Barthe et al's type system (which guarantees non-interference) then its translation is typable in our type system. This result opens up the possibility to leverage existing bytecode verifiers for Java to certify non-interference properties of Android bytecode.
I. INTRODUCTION
Android is an operating system that has been used in many mobile devices. According to [1] , Android has the largest market share for mobile devices, making it an attractive target for malwares, so verification of the security properties of Android apps is crucial. To install an application, users can download applications from Google Play or third-party app stores in the form of an Android Application Package (APK). Each of these applications runs in an instance of a Dalvik virtual machine (VM) on top of the Linux operating system. Contained in each of these APKs is a DEX file containing specific instructions [2] to be executed by the Dalvik VM, so from here on we will refer to these bytecode instructions as DEX instructions. The Dalvik VM is a register-based VM, unlike the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) which is a stack-based VM. Dalvik is now superseded by a new runtime framework called ART, but this does not affect our analysis since both Dalvik and ART use the same DEX instructions.
We aim at providing a framework for constructing trustworthy apps, where developers of apps can provide guarantees that the (sensitive) information the apps use is not leaked outside the device without the user's consent. The framework should also provide a mean for the end user to verify that apps constructed using the framework adhere to their advertised security policies. This is, of course, not a new concept, and it is essentially a rehash of the (foundational) proof carrying code (PCC) [3] , [4] , applied to the Android setting. We follow a type-based approach for restricting information flow [5] in Android apps. Semantically, information flow properties of apps are specified via a notion of non-interference [6] . In this setting, typeable programs are guaranteed to be non-interferrent, with respect to a given policy, and typing derivations serve as certificates of non-interference. Our eventual goal is to produce a compiler tool chain that can help developers to develop Android applications that complies with a given policy, and automate the process of generating the final non-interference certificates for DEX bytecode.
An Android application is typically written in Java and compiled to Java classes (JVM bytecode). Then using tools provided in the Android Software Development Kit (SDK), these Java classes are further compiled into an Android application in the form of an APK. One important tool in this compilation chain is the dx tool, which will aggregate the Java classes and produce a DEX file to be bundled together with other resource files in the APK. Non-interference type systems exist for Java source code [7] , JVM [8] and (abstracted) DEX bytecode [9] . To build a framework that allows end-to-end certificate production, one needs to study certificate translation between these different type systems. The connection between Java and JVM type systems for non-interference has been studied in [10] . In this work, we fill the gap by showing that the connection between JVM and DEX type systems. Our contributions are the following:
• We give a formal account of the compilation process from JVM bytecode to DEX bytecode as implemented in the official dx tool in Android SDK. Section VI details some of the translation processes.
• We provide a proof that the translation from JVM to DEX preserves typeability. That is, JVM programs typeable in the non-interference type system for JVM translates into typeable programs in the noninterference type system for DEX.
The development of the operational semantics and the type systems for DEX bytecode follows closely the framework set up in [8] . Although Dalvik is a registered-based machine and JVM is a stack-based machine, the translation from one instruction set to the other is for most part quite straightforward. The adaptation of the type system for JVM to its DEX counterpart is complicated slightly by the need to simulate JVM stacks in DEX registered-based instructions. The non-trivial parts are when we want to capture both direct (via operand stacks) and indirect information flow (e.g., those resulting from branching on high value). In [8] , to deal with both direct and indirect flow, several techniques are used, among others, the introduction of operand stack types (each stack element carries a type which is a security label), a notion of safe control dependence region (CDR), which keeps track of the regions of the bytecode executing under a 'high' security level, and the notion of security environment, which attaches security levels to points in programs. Since Dalvik is a registerbased machine, when translating from JVM to DEX, the dx tool simulates the operand stack using DEX registers. As the type system for JVM is parameterised by a safe CDR and a security environment, we also need to define how these are affected by the translation, e.g., whether one can construct a safe CDR for DEX given a safe CDR for JVM. This was complicated by the fact that the translation by dx in general is organized along blocks of sequential (non-branching) codes, so one needs to relate blocks of codes in the image of the translation back to the original codes (see Section VI) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows : in the next section we describe some work done for Java bytecode security and the work on static analysis for Android bytecode. This is important as what we are doing is bridging the relationship between these two security measures. Then we review the work of Barthe et.al. on a non-interferent type system for JVM bytecode. In the remainder of the paper we will describe our work, namely providing the type system for DEX and proving the translation of typability. We also give examples to demonstrate how our methodology is able to detect interference by failure of typability. Before concluding, we provide our design of implementation for the proof of concept.
II. RELATED WORK
As we already mentioned, our work is heavily influenced by the work of Barthe et. al. [11] , [8] on enforcing noninterference via type systems. We discuss other related work in the following.
The cloest to our work is the Cassandra project [9] , [12] , that aims at developing certified app stores, where apps can be certified, using an information-flow type system similar to ours, for absence of specific information flow. Specifically, the authors of [9] , [12] have developed an abstract Dalvik language (ADL), similar to Dalvik bytecode, and a type system for enforcing non-interference properties for ADL. Our type system for Dalvik is essentially that of Cassandra, modulo some minor differences in the language constructs. We choose to deal directly with Dalvik rather than ADL since we aim to eventually integrate our certificate compilation into existing compiler tool chains for Android apps, without having to modify those tool chains.
Bian et. al. [13] targets the JVM bytecode to check whether a program has the non-interference property. Differently from Barthe et. al. their approach uses the idea of the compilation technique where they analyse a variable in the bytecode for its definition and usage. Using this dependence analysis, their tool can detect whether a program leaks confidential information. This is an interesting technique in itself and it is possible to adopt their approach to analyze DEX bytecode. Nevertheless, we are more interested in the transferability of properties instead of the technique in itself, i.e., if we were to use their approach instead of a type system, the question we are trying to answer would become "if the JVM bytecode is non-interferent according to their approach, is the compiled DEX bytecode also non-interferent?".
In the case of preservation of properties itself the idea that a non-optimizing compiler preserves a property is not something new. The work by Barthe et. al. [11] shows that with a non-optimizing compiler, the proof obligation from a source language to a simple stack based language will be the same, thus allowing the reuse of the proof for the proof obligation in the source language. In showing the preservation of a property, they introduce the source imperative language and target language for a stack-based abstract machine. This is the main difference with our work where we are analyzing the actual dx tool from Android which compiles the bytecode language for stack-based virtual machine (JVM bytecode) to the actual language for register-based machine (DEX bytecode). There are also works that address this non-interference preservation from Java source code to JVM bytecode [10] . Our work can then be seen as a complement to their work in that we are extending the type preservation to include the compilation from JVM bytecode to DEX bytecode.
To deal with information flow properties in Android, there are several works addressing the problem [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] although some of them are geared towards the privilege escalation problem. These works base their context of Android security studied in [23] . The tool in the study, which is called Kirin, is also of great interest for us since they deal with the certification of Android applications. Kirin is a lightweight tool which certifies an Android application at install time based on permissions requested. Some of these works are similar to ours in a sense working on static analysis for Android. The closest one to mention is ScanDroid [14] , with the underlying type system and static analysis tool for security specification in Android [24] . Then along the line of type system there is also work by Bugliesi et. al. called Lintent that tries to address noninterference on the source code level [15] . The main difference with what we do lies in that the analysis itself is relying on the existence of the source (the JVM bytecode for ScanDroid and Java source code for Lintent) from which the DEX program is translated.
There are some other static analysis tools for Android which do not stem from the idea of type system, e.g. TrustDroid [17] and ScanDal [18] . TrustDroid is another static analysis tool on Android bytecode, trying to prevent information leaking. TrustDroid is more interested in doing taint analysis on the program, although different from TaintDroid [16] in that TrustDroid is doing taint analysis statically from decompiled DEX bytecode whereas TaintDroid is enforcing run time taint analysis. ScanDal is also a static analysis for Android applications targetting the DEX instructions directly, aggregating the instructions in a language they call Dalvik Core. They enumerate all possible states and note when any value from any predefined information source is flowing through a predefined information sink. Their work assumed that predefined sources and sinks are given, whereas we are more interested in a flexible policy to define them.
Since the property that we are interested in is noninterference, it is also worth mentioning Sorbet, a run time enforcement of the property by modifying the Android operating system [19] , [20] . Their approach is different from our binop op ∶ binary operation on stack push c ∶ push value on top of a stack pop ∶ pop value from top of a stack swap ∶ swap top two operand stack values load x ∶ load value of x on stack store x ∶ store top of stack in variable x ifeq j ∶ conditional jump goto j ∶ unconditional jump return ∶ return the top value of the stack new C ∶ create new object in the heap getfield f ∶ load value of field f on stack putfield f ∶ store top of stack in field f newarray t ∶ create new array of type t in the heap arraylength ∶ get the length of an array arrayload ∶ load value from an array arraystore ∶ store value in array invoke m ID ∶ Invoke method indicated by m ID with arguments on top of the stack throw ∶ Throw exception at the top of a stack where op ∈ {+, −, ×, }, c ∈ Z, x ∈ X , j ∈ PP, C ∈ C, f ∈ F, t ∈ T J , and m ID ∈ M.
Fig. 1: JVM Instruction List
ultimate goal which motivates this work in that we are aiming for no modification in the Android operating system.
III. TYPE SYSTEM FOR JVM
In this section, we give an overview of Barthe et. al's type system for JVM. Due to space constraints, some details are omitted and the reader is referred to [8] for a more detailed explanation and intuitions behind the design of the type system. Readers who are already familiar with the work of Barthe et. al may skip this section.
A program P is given by its list of instructions given in Figure 1 . The set X is the set of local variables, V = Z ⋃ L ⋃{null} is the set of values, where L is an (infinite) set of locations and null denotes the null pointer, and PP is the set of program points. We use the notation * to mean that for any set X, X * is a stack of elements of X. Programs are also implicitly parameterized by a set C of class names, a set F of field identifiers, a set M of method names, and a set of Java types T J . The instructions listing can be seen in Figure 1 .
Operational Semantics
The operational semantics is given as a relation ↝ m,τ ⊆ State × (State + (V, heap)) where m indicates the method under which the relation is considered and τ indicates whether the instruction is executing normally (indicated by Norm) or throwing an exception. (sometimes we omit m whenever it is clear which m we are referring to, we may also remove τ when it is clear from the context whether the instruction is executing normally or not ). State here represents a set of JVM states, which is a tuple ⟨i, ρ, os, h⟩ where i ∈ PP is the program counter that points to the next instruction to be executed; ρ ∈ X ⇀ V is a partial function from local variables to values, os ∈ V * is an operand stack, and h ∈ heap is the heap for that particular state. Heaps are modeled as partial functions h ∶ L ⇀ O + A, where the set O of objects is modeled as C × (F ⇀ V), i.e. each object o ∈ O possess a class class(o) and a partial function to access field values, which is denoted by o.f to access the value of field f of object o. A is the set of arrays modeled as N × (N ⇀ V) × PP i.e. each array has a length, partial function from index to value, and a creation point. The creation point will be used to define the notion of array indistinguishability. Heap is the set of heaps.
The program also comes equipped with a partial function Handler m ∶ PP × C ⇀ PP. We write Handler m (i, C) = t for an exception of class C ∈ C thrown at program point i, which will be caught by a handler with its starting program point t. In the case where the exception is uncaught, we write Handler m (i, C) ↑ instead. The final states will be (V + L) × Heap to differentiate between normal termination (v, h) ∈ V × Heap, and an uncaught exception (⟨l⟩, h) ∈ L + Heap which contains the location l for the exception in the heap h.
op denotes here the standard interpretation of arithmetic operation of op in the domain of values V (although there is no arithmetic operation on locations).
The instruction that may throw an exception primarily are method invocation and the object/array manipulation instructions. {np} is used as the class for null pointer exceptions, with the associated exception handler being RuntimeExceptionHandling. The transitions are also parameterized by a tag τ ∈ {Norm} + C to describe whether the transition occurs normally or some exception is thrown. Some last remarks: firstly, because of method invocation, the operational semantics will also be mixed with a big step semantics style ↝ + m from method invocations of method m and its associated result, to be more precise ↝ + m is a transitive closure of ↝ m . Then, for instructions that may not throw an exception, we remove the subscript {m, Norm} from ↝ because it is clear that they have no exception throwing operational semantic counterpart. A list of operational semantics are contained in Figure 2 . We do not show the full list of operational semantics due to space limitations. However, the interested reader can see Figure 7 in Appendix C for the full list of JVM operational semantics.
Successor Relation The successor relation ↦⊆ PP × PP of a program P are tagged with whether the execution is normal or throwing an exception. According to the types of instructions at program point i, there are several possibilities:
In this case, there are 2 successor relations denoted by i ↦ Norm i + 1 and i ↦ Norm t.
• P m [i] = return. In this case it is a return point denoted by i ↦
is an instruction throwing a null pointer exception, and there is a handler for it (Handler(i, np) = t). In this case, the successor is t denoted by i ↦ np t.
• P m [i] is an instruction throwing a null pointer exception, and there is no handler for it (Handler(i, np) ↑ ). In this case it is a return point denoted by i ↦ np . • P m [i] = throw, throwing an exception C ∈ classAnalysis(m, i), and Handler(i, C) = t. The successor relation is i ↦ C t.
• P m [i] = throw, throwing an exception C ∈ classAnalysis(m, i), and Handler(i, C) = t. It is a return point and the successor relation is i ↦ C .
• P m [i] = invoke m ID , throwing an exception C ∈ excAnalysis(m ID ), and Handler(i, C) = t. The successor relation is i ↦ C t.
• P m [i] = invoke m ID , throwing an exception C ∈ excAnalysis(m ID ), and Handler(i, C) ↑. It is a return point and the successor relation is i ↦ C .
• P m [i] is any other cases. The successor is its immediate instruction denoted by i ↦ norm i + 1
Typing Rules
The security level is defined as a partially ordered set (S, ≤) of security levels S that form a lattice. ⊔ denotes the lub of two security levels, and for every k ∈ S, lift k is a point-wise extension to stack types of λl.k ⊔ l. The policy of a method is also defined relative to a security level k obs which denotes the capability of an observer to observe values from local variables, fields, and return values whose security level are below k obs .The typing rules are defined in terms of stack types, that is a stack that associates a value in the operand stack to the set of security levels S. The stack type itself takes the form of a stack with corresponding indices from the operand stack, as shown below.
We assume that a method comes with its security policy of the form ⃗ k a k h → ⃗ k r where ⃗ k a represents a list {v 1 ∶ k 1 , . . . , v n ∶ k n } with k i ∈ S being the security level of local variables v i ∈ R, k h is the effect of the method on the heap and ⃗ k r is the return signature, i.e. the security levels of the return value. The return signature is of the form of a list to cater for the possibility of an uncaught exception on top of the normal return value. The ⃗ k r is a list of the form {Norm ∶ k n , e 1 ∶ k e1 , . . . , e n ∶ k en } where k n is the security level for the normal return value, and e i is the class of the uncaught exception thrown by the method and k ei is the associated security level. In the sequel, we write ⃗ k r [n] to stand for k n and ⃗ k r [e i ] to stand for k ei . An example of this policy can be {1 ∶ L, 2 ∶ H} H → {Norm ∶ L} where L, H ∈ S, L ≤ k obs , H ≰ k obs which indicates that the method will return a low value, and that throughout the execution of the method, the security level of local variable 1 will be low while the security level of local variable 2 will be high. Arrays have an extended security level than that of the usual object or value to cater for the security level of the contents. The security level of an array will be of the form k[k c ] where k represents the security level of an array and k c will represent the security level of its content (this implies that all array elements have the same security level k c ). Denote S ext as the extension of security levels S to define the array's security level. The partial order on S will also be extended with ≤ ext :
Generally, in the case of a comparison between extended level k[k c ] ∈ S ext and a standard level k ′ ∈ S, we only compare k and k ′ w.r.t. the partial order on S. In the case of comparison with k obs , since k obs ∈ S an extended security
Only k obs and se (defined later) will stay in the form of S, everything else will be extended to also include the extended level S ext .
The transfer rules come equipped with a security policy for fields ft ∶ F → S ext and at ∶ PP → S ext that maps the creation point of an array with the security level of its content. at(a) will also be used to denote the security level of the content of array a at its creation point.
The notation Γ is used to define the table of method signatures which will associate a method identifier m ID and a security level k ∈ S (of the object invoked) to a security signature Γ m ID [k] . The collection of security signatures of a method m is defined as A method is also parameterized by a control dependence region (CDR) which is defined in terms of two functions: region and jun. The function region ∶ PP → ℘(PP) can be seen as all the program points executing under the guard of the instruction at the specified program point, i.e. in the case of region(i) the guard will be program point i. The function jun(i) itself can be seen as the nearest program point which all instructions in region(i) have to execute (junction point). A CDR is safe if it satisfies the following SOAP (Safe Over APproximation) properties.
Definition III.1. A CDR structure (region, jun) satisfies the SOAP properties if the following properties hold :
SOAP1. ∀i, j, k ∈ PP and tag τ such that i ↦ j and i ↦ τ k and j ≠ k (i is hence a branching point), k ∈ region(i, τ ) or k = jun(i, τ ). SOAP2. ∀i, j, k ∈ PP and tag τ , if j ∈ region(i, τ ) and j ↦ k, then either k ∈ region(i, τ ) or k = jun(i, τ ). SOAP3. ∀i, j ∈ PP and tag τ , if j ∈ region(i, τ ) and j is a return point then jun(i, τ ) is undefined. SOAP4. ∀i ∈ PP and tags τ 1 , τ 2 if jun(i, τ 1 ) and jun(i, τ 2 ) are defined and jun(i,
region(i, τ 1 ). SOAP5. ∀i, j ∈ PP and tag τ , if j ∈ region(i, τ ) and j is a return point then for all tags τ ′ such that
The security environment function se ∶ PP → S is a map from a program point to a security level. The notation ⇒ represents a relation between the stack type before execution and the stack type after execution of an instruction.
The typing system is formally parameterized by :
a table of method signatures, needed to define the transfer rules for method invocation; ft:
a map from fields to their global policy level; CDR: a structure consists of (region, jun). se: security environment sgn:
method signature of the current method thus the complete form of a judgement parameterized by a tag τ ∈ {Norm + C} is
although in the case where some elements are unnecessary, we may omit some of the parameters e.g. i ⊢ S i ⇒ st
As in the operational semantics, wherever it is clear that the instructions may not throw an exception, we remove the tag Norm to reduce clutter. The transfer rules are contained in Figure 3 (for the full list of transfer rules, see Figure 8 in Appendix C). Using these transfer rules, we can then define the notion of typability:
Definition III.2 (Typable method). A method m is typable w.r.t. a method signature table Γ, a global field policy ft, a policy sgn, and a CDR region m ∶ PP → ℘(PP) if there exists a security environment se ∶ PP → S and a function S ∶ PP → S * s.t. S 1 = and for all i, j ∈ PP, and exception tags e ∈ {Norm + C}:
where ⊑ denotes the point-wise partial order on type stack w.r.t. the partial order taken on security levels.
The Non-interference definition relies on the notion of indistinguishability. Loosely speaking, a method is noninterferent whenever given indistinguishable inputs, it yields indistinguishable outputs. To cater for this definition, first there are definitions of indistinguishability.
To define the notions of location, object, and array indistinguishability itself Barthe et. al. define the notion of a β mapping. β is a bijection on (a partial set of ) locations in the heap. The bijection maps low objects (objects whose references might be stored in low fields or variables) allocated in the heap of the first state to low objects allocated in the heap of the second state. The object might be indistiguishable, even if their locations are different during execution.
Definition III.3 (Value indistinguishability). Letting v, v 1 , v 2 ∈ V, and given a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L, the relation ∼ β ⊆ V × V is defined by the clauses :
Definition III.5 (Object indistinguishability). Two objects o 1 , o 2 ∈ O are indistinguishable with respect to a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L (noted by o 1 ∼ k obs ,β o 2 ) if and only if o 1 and o 2 are objects of the same class and
Definition III.6 (Array indistinguishability). Two arrays a 1 , a 2 ∈ A are indistinguishable w.r.t. an attacker level k obs and a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L (noted by a 1 ∼ k obs ,β o 2 ) if and only if a 1 .length = a 2 .length and, moreover, if
Definition III.7 (Heap indistinguishability). Two heaps h 1 and h 2 are indistinguishable, written h 1 ∼ k obs ,β h 2 , with respect to an attacker level k obs and a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L iff:
• β is a bijection between dom(β) and rng(β);
and h 2 (β(l)) are either two objects or two arrays.
Definition III.8 (Output indistinguishability)
. Given an attacker level k obs , a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L, an output level ⃗ k r , the indistinguishability of two final states in method m is defined by the clauses :
At this point it is worth mentioning that whenever it is clear from the usage, we may drop some subscript from the indistinguishability relation, e.g. for two indistinguishable objects o 1 and o 2 w.r.t. a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L and observer level k obs , instead of writing o 1 ∼ k obs ,β o 2 we may drop k obs and write o 1 ∼ β o 2 if k obs is obvious. We may also
Because of method invocation, there will be a notion of a side effect preorder for the notion of safety.
Definition III.10 (Side effect preorder). Two heaps h 1 , h 2 ∈ Heap are side effect preordered (written as h 1 ⪯ k h 2 ) with respect to a security level k ∈ S if and only if dom(h 1 ) ⊆ dom(h 2 ) and h 1 (l).f = h 2 (l).f for all location l ∈ dom(h 1 ) and all fields f ∈ F such that k ≰ ft(f ).
From which we can define a side-effect-safe method.
Definition III.11 (Side effect safe). A method m is side-effectsafe with respect to a security level k h if for all local variables 
IV. DEX TYPE SYSTEM
A program P is given by its list of instructions in Figure 4 . The set R is the set of DEX virtual registers, V is the set of values, and PP is the set of program points. Since the DEX translation involves simulation of the JVM which uses a stack, we will also distinguish the registers :
• registers used to store the local variables,
• registers used to store parameters,
• and registers used to simulate the stack.
In practice, there is no difference between registers used to simulate the stack and those that are used to store local variables. The translation of a JVM method refers to code which assumes that the parameters are already copied to the local variables.
As in the case for JVM, we assume that the program comes equipped with the set of class names C and the set of fields F. The program will also be extended with array manipulation instructions, and the program will come parameterized by the 
r, r l , t r = new array of type t with r l number of elements arraylength r, r a ρ(r) = ρ(r a ).length
).m with n arguments stored in ⃗ p moveresult r store invoke's result to r. Must be placed directly after invoke throw r throw the exception in r move− r store exception in r. Have to exception be the first in the handler.
where op ∈ {+, −, ×, }, v ∈ Z, {r, r a , r b , r s } ∈ R, t ∈ PP, c ∈ C, f ∈ F and ρ ∶ R → Z. set of available DEX types T D analogous to Java type T J . The DEX language also deals with method invocation. As for JVM, DEX programs will also come with a set m of method names. The method name and signatures themselves are represented explicitly in the DEX file, as such the lookup function required will be different from the JVM counterpart in that we do not need the class argument, thus in the sequel we will remove this lookup function and overload that method ID to refer to the code as well. DEX uses two special registers. We will use ret for the first one which can hold the return value of a method invocation. In the case of a moveresult, the instruction behaves like a move instruction with the special register ret as the source register. The second special register is ex which stores an exception thrown for the next instruction. Figure 4 contains the list of DEX instructions.
Operational Semantics A state in DEX is just ⟨i, ρ, h⟩ where the ρ here is a mapping from registers to values and h is the heap. As for the JVM in handling the method invocation, operational semantics are also extended to have a big step semantics for the method invoked. Figure 5 shows some of the operational semantics for DEX instructions. Refer to Figure 9 in Appendix D for a full list of DEX operational semantics.
The successor relation closely resembles that of the JVM, instructions will have its next instruction as the successor, except jump instructions, return instructions, and instructions that throw an exception.
Type Systems The transfer rules of DEX are defined in terms of registers typing rt ∶ (R → S) instead of stack typing. Note that this registers typing is total w.r.t. the registers used in the method. To be more concrete, if a method only uses 16 registers then rt is a map for these 16 registers to security levels, as opposed to the whole number of 65535 registers.
The transfer rules also come equipped with a security policy for fields ft ∶ F → S ext and at ∶ PP → S ext . Some of the transfer rules for DEX instructions are contained in Figure 6 . Full transfer rules are contained in Appendix D.
The typability of the DEX closely follows that of the JVM, except that the relation between program points is i ⊢ RT i ⇒ rt, rt ⊑ RT j . The definition of ⊑ is also defined in terms of point-wise registers. For now we assume the existence of safe CDR with the same definition as that of the JVM side. We shall see later how we can construct a safe CDR for DEX from a safe CDR in JVM. Formal definition of typable DEX method:
Definition IV.1 (Typable method). A method m is typable w.r.t. a method signature table Γ, a global field policy ft, a policy sgn, and a CDR region m ∶ PP → ℘(PP) if there exists a security environment se ∶ PP → S and a function RT ∶ PP → (R → S) s.t. RT 1 = ⃗ k a and for all i, j ∈ PP, e ∈ {Norm + C}:
• i ↦ e j implies there exists rt ∈ (R → S) such that Γ, ft, region, se, sgn, i ⊢ e RT i ⇒ rt and rt ⊑ RT j ;
Following that of the JVM side, what we want to establish here is not just the typability, but also that typability means non-interference. As in the JVM, the notion of non-interference relies on the definition of indistinguishability, while the notion of value indistinguishability is the same as that of JVM.
Definition IV.3 (Object indistinguishability). 
Definition IV.4 (Array indistinguishability). • β is a bijection between dom(β) and rng(β);
Definition IV.6 (Output indistinguishability). Given an attacker level k obs , a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L, an output level ⃗ k r , the indistinguishability of two final states in method m is defined by the clauses :
where → indicates logical implication.
2 ) Definition IV.8 (Side effect preorder). Two heaps h 1 , h 2 ∈ Heap are side effect preordered with respect to a security level k ∈ S (written as h 1 ⪯ k h 2 ) if and only if dom(h 1 ) ⊆ dom(h 2 ) and h 1 (l).f = h 2 (l).f for all location l ∈ dom(h 1 ) and all fields f ∈ F such that k ≰ ft(f ).
Definition IV.9 (Side effect safe). A method m is side-effectsafe with respect to a security level k h if for all registers in ρ ∈ R ⇀ V, dom(ρ) = locR, for all heaps h, h ′ ∈ Heap and value v ∈ V, ⟨1, ρ, h⟩ 
V. EXAMPLES
Throughout our examples we will use two security levels L and H to indicate low and high security level respectively.
We start with a simple example where a high guard is used to determine the value of a low variable.
Example V.1. Assume that local variable 1 is H and local variable 2 is L. For now also assume that r 3 is the start of the registers used to simulate the stack in the DEX instructions. Consider the following JVM bytecode and its translation.
In this case, the type system for the JVM bytecode will reject this example because there is a violation in the first store 2 constraint. The reasoning is that se(i) for push 0 will be H, thus the constraint will be H ⊔ H ≤ L which can not be satisfied. The same goes for the DEX instructions. Since r 3 gets its value from r 1 which is H, the typing rule for ifeq(r 3 , l 1 ) states that se in the last instruction will be H.
Since the last move instruction is targetting variables in the local variables side, the constraint applies, which states that H ⊔ H ≤ L which also can not be satisfied, thus this program will be rejected by the DEX type system.
The following example illustrates one of the types of the interference caused by modification of low fields of a high object aliased to a low object.
Example V.2. Assume that ⃗ k a = {r 1 ↦ H, r 2 ↦ H, r 3 ↦ L} (which means local variable 1 is high, local variable 2 is high and local variable 3 is low). Also the field f is low (ft(f ) = L).
The above JVM bytecode and its translation will be rejected by the type system for the JVM bytecode because for putfield f at the last line there is a constraint with the security level of the object. In this case, the load 1 instruction will push a reference of the object with high security level, therefore, the constraint that L ⊔ H ⊔ L ≤ L can not be satisfied. The same goes for the DEX type system, it will also reject the translated program. The reasoning is that the move(r 4 , r 1 ) instruction will copy a reference to the object stored in r 1 which has a high security level, therefore rt(r 4 ) = H. Then, at the iput(r 5 , r 4 , f ) we won't be able to satisfy
This last example shows that the type system also handles information flow through exceptions.
Handler(l 2 , np) = l h , and for any e, Handler(l 2 , e) ↑. The following JVM bytecode and its translation will be rejected by the typing system for the JVM bytecode.
The reason is that the typing constraint for the invokevirtual will be separated into several tags, and on each tag of execution we will have se as high (because the local variable 3 is high). Therefore, when the program reaches store 2 (line 8 and 10) the constraint is violated since we have ⃗ k a (r 2 ) = L, thus the program is rejected. Similar reasoning holds for the DEX type system as well, in that the invoke will have se high because the object on which the method is invoked upon is high, therefore the typing rule will reject the program because it can not satisfy the constraint when the program is about to store the value in local variable 2 (constraint H ≤ L is violated, where H comes from lub with se).
VI. TRANSLATION PHASE
Before we continue to describe the translation processes, we find it helpful to first define a construct called the basic block. The Basic block is a construct containing a group of code that has one entry point and one exit point (not necessarily one successor/one parent), has parents list, successors list, primary succesor, and its order in the output phase. There are also some auxilliary functions :
BMap is a mapping function from program pointer in JVM bytecode to a DEX basic block. SBMap Similar to BMap, this function takes a program pointer in JVM bytecode and returns whether that instruction is the start of a DEX basic block. TSMap A function that maps a program pointer in JVM bytecode to an integer denoting the index to the top of the stack. Initialized with the number of local variables as that index is the index which will be used by DEX to simulate the stack. NewBlock A function to create a new Block and associate it with the given instruction.
The DEX bytecode is simulating the JVM bytecode although they have different infrastructure. DEX is register-based whereas JVM is stack-based. To bridge this gap, DEX uses registers to simulate the stack. The way it works :
• l number of registers are used to hold local variables.
(1, . . . , l). We denote these registers with locR.
• Immediately after l, there are s number of registers which are used to simulate the stack (l + 1, . . . , l + s).
Note that although in principal stack can grow indefinitely, it is impossible to write a program that does so in Java, due to the strict stack discipline in Java. Given a program in JVM bytecode, it is possible to statically determine the height of the operand stack at each program point. This makes it possible to statically map each operand stack location to a register in DEX (cf. TSMap above and Appendix A-C); see [25] for a discussion on how this can be done.
There are several phases involved to translate JVM bytecode into DEX bytecode:
StartBlock: Indicates the program point at which the instruction starts a block, then creates a new block for each of these program points and associates it with a new empty block.
TraceParentChild: Resolves the parents successors (and primary successor) relationship between blocks. Implicit in this phase is a step creating a temporary return block used to hold successors of the block containing return instruction. At this point in time, assume there is a special label called ret to address this temporary return block.
The creation of a temporary return block depends on whether the function returns a value. If it is return void, then this block contains only the instruction return-void. Otherwise depending on the type returned (integer, wide, object, etc), the instruction is translated into the corresponding move and return. The move instruction moves the value from the register simulating the top of the stack to register 0. Then return will just return r 0 .
Translate: Translate JVM instructions into DEX instructions.
PickOrder: Order blocks according to "trace analysis".
Output: Output the instructions in order. During this phase, goto will be added for each block whose next block to output is not its successor. After the compiler has output all blocks, it will then read the list of DEX instructions and fix up the targets of jump instructions. Finally, all the information about exception handlers is collected and put in the section that deals with exception handlers in the DEX file structure.
Definition VI.1 (Translated JVM Program). The translation of a JVM program P into blocks and have their JVM instructions translated into DEX instructions is denoted by P , where
Definition VI.2 (Output Translated Program). The output of the translated JVM program P in which the blocks are ordered and then output into DEX program is denoted by P , where
Definition VI.3 (Compiled JVM Program). The compilation of a JVM program P is denoted by P , where
Details for each of the phase can be seen in appendix A.
VII. PROOF THAT TRANSLATION PRESERVES TYPABILITY

A. Compilation of CDR and Security Environments
Since now we will be working on blocks, we need to know how the CDRs of the JVM and that of the translated DEX are related. First we need to define the definition of the successor relation between blocks.
Definition VII.1 (Block Successor). Suppose a ↦ b and a and b are on different blocks. Let B a be the block containing a and B b be the block containing b. Then B b will be the successor of B a denoted by abusing the notation B a ↦ B b .
Before we continue on with the properties of CDR and SOAP, we first need to define the translation of region and jun since we assume that the JVM bytecode comes equipped with region and jun.
Definition VII.2 (Region Translation and Compilation
Definition VII.4 (Region Translation and Compilation for handler). ∀i, j.j ∈ region(i, τ ), let i e be the instruction in P [i] that possibly throws, then handler(i e , τ ) ∈ region(i e , τ ) in P and handler( i e , τ ) ∈ region( i e , τ ) in P (note that the handler will point to moveexception).
Definition VII.5 (Region for appended goto instruction).
Definition VII.6 (Junction Translation and Compilation
Definition VII.7 (Security Environment Translation and Compilation). ∀i ∈ PP, j ∈ i .se(j) = se(i) in P and ∀i ∈ PP, j ∈ i .se( j ) = se(i) in P . Lemma VII.1 (SOAP Preservation). The SOAP properties are preserved in the translation from JVM to DEX, i.e. if the JVM program satisfies the SOAP properties, so does the translated DEX program.
B. Compilation Preserves Typability
There are several assumption we make for this compilation. Firstly, the JVM program will not modify its self reference for an object. Secondly, since now we are going to work in blocks, the notion of se, S, and RT will also be defined in term of this addressing. A new scheme for addressing blockAddress is defined from sets of pairs (bi, j), bi ∈ blockIndex, a set of all block indices (label of the first instruction in the block), where ∀i ∈ PP.∃bi, j. s.t.bi + j = i. We also add additional relation ⇒ * to denote the reflexive and transitive closure of ⇒ to simplify the typing relation between blocks. We overload . and . to also apply to stack type to denote translation from stack type into typing for registers. This translation basically just maps each element of the stack to registers at the end of registers containing the local variables (with the top of the stack with larger index, i.e. stack expanding to the right), and fill the rest with high security level. More formally, if there are n local variables denoted by v 1 , . . . , v n and stack type with the height of m (0 denotes the top of the stack), and the method has o registers (which corresponds to the maximum depth of the stack), then
Lastly, the function . is also overloaded for addressing (bi, i) to denote abstract address in the DEX side which will actually be instantiated when producing the output DEX program from the blocks.
Due to the way stack type is translated to registers typing, we find it beneficial to introduce a simple lemma that can be proved trivially (by structural induction and definition) in regards to the rt 1 ⊑ rt 2 relation. In particular this lemma will relates the registers metioned in rt 1 but are not mentioned in rt 2 .
Lemma VII.2 (Registers Not in Stack Less Equal).
Let the number of local variables be locN . For any two stack types st 1 , st 2 , length(st 1 ) = n, length(st 2 ) = m, m < n, any register x ∈ {r locN +m+1 , . . . , r locN +m+n }, and register types
Definition VII.8 ( excAnalysis and excAnalysis ).
∀m ∈ M. excAnalysis(m) = excAnalysis(m) in P and ∀m ∈ M. excAnalysis(m) = excAnalysis(m) in P . Definition VII.9 ( classAnalysis and classAnalysis ). Let e be the index of the throwing instruction from i .
The idea of the proof that compilation from JVM bytecode to DEX bytecode preserves typability is that any instruction that does not modify the block structure can be proved using Lemma VII.3, Lemma VII.4 and Lemma VII.5 to prove the typability of register typing.
Initially we state lemmas saying that typable JVM instructions will yield typable DEX instructions. Paired with each normal execution is the lemma for the exception throwing one. These lemmas are needed to handle the additional block of moveexception attached for each exception handler.
Lemma VII.3. For any JVM program P with instruction Ins at address i and tag Norm, let the length of Ins be n. Let
according to the typing rule(s) of Ins .
Lemma VII.4. For any JVM program P with instruction Ins at address i and tag τ ≠ Norm with exception handler at address i e . Let the length of Ins until the instruction that throws exception τ be denoted by n. Let (be, 0) = i e be the address of the handler for that particular exception. If i ⊢ τ S i ⇒ st according to the transfer rule for Ins, then
according to the typing rule(s) of the first n instructions in Ins and moveexception.
Lemma VII.5. Let Ins be an instruction at address i, i ↦ j, st, S i and S j are stack types such that i ⊢ S i ⇒ st, st ⊑ S j . Let n be the length of Ins . Let
= S j and rt be registers typing obtained from the transfer rules involved in
We need an additional lemma to establish that the constraints in the JVM transfer rules are satisfied after the translation. This is because the definition of typability also relies on the constraint which can affect the existence of register typing.
Lemma VII.6. Let Ins be an instruction at program point i, S i its corresponding stack types, and let
satisfy the typing constraint for Ins with the stack type S i , then ∀(bj, j) ∈ i .P DEX [bj, j] will also satisfy the typing constraints for all instructions in Ins with the initial registers typing
Using the above lemmas, we can prove the lemma that all the resulting blocks will also be typable in DEX.
Lemma VII.7. Let P be a Java program such that ∀i, j.i ↦ j.∃st.i ⊢ S i ⇒ st and st ⊑ S j Then P will satisfy
where
After we established that the translation into DEX instructions in the form of blocks preserves typability, we also need ensure that the next phases in the translation process also preserves typability. The next phases are ordering the blocks, output the DEX code, then fix the branching targets.
Lemma VII.8. Let P be typable basic blocks resulting from translation of JVM instructions still in the block form, i.e. P = Translate(TraceParentChild(StartBlock(P ))).
Given the ordering scheme to output the block contained in PickOrder, if the starting block starts with flag 0 (F (0,0) = 0) then the output P is also typable.
Finally, the main result of this paper in that the compilation of typable JVM bytecode will yield typable DEX bytecode which can be proved from Lemma VII.7 and Lemma VII.8. Typable DEX bytecode will also have the non-interferent property because it is based on a safe CDR (Lemma VII.1) according to DEX.
Theorem VII.1. Let P be a typable JVM bytecode according to its safe CDR (region, jun), PA-Analysis (classAnalysis and excAnalysis), and method policies Γ, then P according to the translation scheme has the property that
according to a safe CDR ( region , jun ), PA − Analysis , and Γ .
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented the design of a type system for DEX programs and showed that the non-optimizing compilation done by the dx tool preserves the typability of JVM bytecode. Furthermore, the typability of the DEX program also implies its non-interference. We provide a proof-of-concept implementation illustrating the feasibility of the idea. This opens up the possibility of reusing analysis techniques applicable to Java bytecode for Android. As an immediate next step for this research, we plan to also take into account the optimization done in the dx tool to see whether typability is still preserved by the translation.
Our result is quite orthogonal to the Bitblaze project [26] , where they aim to unify different bytecodes into a common intermediate language, and then analyze this intermediate language instead. At this moment, we still do not see yet how DEX bytecode can be unified with this intermediate language as there is a quite different approach in programming Android's applications, namely the use of the message passing paradigm which has to be built into the Bitblaze infrastructure. This problem with message passing paradigm is essentially a limitation to our currentwork as well in that we still have not identified special object and method invocation for this message passing mechanism in the bytecode.
In this study, we have not worked directly with the dx tool; rather, we have written our own DEX compiler in Ocaml based on our understanding of how the actual dx tool works. This allows us to look at several sublanguages of DEX bytecode in isolation. The output of our custom compiler resembles the output from the dx compiler up to some details such as the size of register addressing. Following the Compcert project [27] , [28] , we would ultimately like to have a fully certified end to end compiler. We leave this as future work.
APPENDIX A TRANSLATION APPENDIX
This section details compilation phases described in Section VI in more details. We first start this section by detailing the structure of basic block. BasicBlock is a structure of {parents; succs; pSucc; order; insn} which denotes a structure of a basic block where parents ⊆ Z is a set of the block's parents, succs ⊆ Z is a set of the block's successors, pSucc ∈ Z is the primary successor of the block (if the block does not have a primary successor it will have −1 as the value), order ∈ Z is the order of the block in the output phase, and insn ∪ DEXins is the DEX instructions contained in the block. The set of BasicBlock is denoted as BasicBlocks.When instatiating the basic block, we denote the default object N ewBlock, which will be a basic block with {parents = ∅; succs = ∅; pSucc = −1; order = −1; insn = ∅} Throughout the compilation phases, we also make use of two mappings PMap ∶ PP → PP and BMap ∶ PP ⇀ BasicBlocks. The mapping PMap is a mapping from a program point in JVM to a program point in JVM which starts a particular block, e.g. if we have a set of program points {2, 3, 4} forming a basic block, then we have that PMap(2) = 2, PMap(3) = 2, and PMap(4) = 2. BMap itself will be used to map a program point in JVM to a basic block.
A
. Indicate Instructions starting a Block (StartBlock)
This phase is done by sweeping through the JVM instructions (still in the form of a list). In the implementation, this phase will update the mapping startBlock. Apart from the first instruction, which will be the starting block regardless of the instruction, the instructions that become the start of a block have the characteristics that either they are a target of a branching instruction, or the previous instruction ends a block.
Case by case translation behaviour :
is Unconditional jump (goto t) : the target instruction will be a block starting point. There is implicit in this instruction that the next instruction should also be a start of the block, but this will be handled by another jump. We do not take care of the case where no jump instruction addresses this next instruction (the next instruction is a dead code), i.e.
○ BMap ⊕ {t ↦ N ewBlock}; and ○ PMap ⊕ {t ↦ t}
is Conditional jump (ifeq t) : both the target instruction and the next instruction will be the start of a block, i.e.
○ BMap ⊕ {t ↦ N ewBlock, (i + 1) ↦ N ewBlock}; and ○ PMap ⊕ {t ↦ t, (i + 1) ↦ (i + 1)}.
• P [i] is Return: the next instruction will be the start of a block. This instruction will update the mapping of the next instruction for BMap and SBMap if this instruction is not at the end of the instruction list.
The reason is that we already assumed that there is no dead code, so the next instruction must be part of some execution path. To be more explicit, if there is a next instruction i + 1 then
is an instruction which may throw an exception : just like return instruction, the next instruction will be the start of a new block. During this phase, there is also the setup for the additional block containing the sole instruction of moveexception which serves as an intermediary between the block with throwing instruction and its exception handler. Then for each associated exception handler, its: startPC program counter (pc) which serves as the starting point (inclusive) of which the exception handler is active; endPC program counter which serves as the ending point (exclusive) of which the exception handler is active; and handlerPC program counter which points to the start of the exception handler are indicated as starting of a block. For handler h, the intermediary block will have label intP C = maxLabel + h.handlerPC. To reduce clutter, we write sP C to stand for h.startPC, eP C to stand for h.endPC, and hP C to stand for h.handlerPC. Before we mention the procedure to establish the parents successors relationship, we need to introduce an additional function getAvailableLabel. Although defined clearly in the dx compiler itself, we'll abstract away from the detail and define the function as getting a fresh label which will not conflict with any existing label and labels for additional blocks before handler. These additional blocks before handlers are basically a block with a single instruction moveexception with the primary successor of the handler. Suppose the handler is at program point i, then this block will have a label of maxLabel+i with the primary successor i. Furthermore, when a block has this particular handler as one of its successors, the successor index is pointed to maxLabel + i (the block containing moveexception instead of i). In the sequel, whenever we say to add a handler to a block, it means that adding this additional block as successor a of the mentioned block, e.g. in the JVM bytecode, block i has exception handlers at j and k, so during translation block i will have successors of {maxLabel + j, maxLabel + k}, block j and k will have additional parent of block maxLabel + j and maxLabel + k, and they each will have block i as their sole parent.
This phase is also done by sweeping through the JVM instructions but with the additional help of BMap and PMap mapping. Case by case translation behaviour :
is Unconditional jump (goto t) : update the successors of the current block with the target branching, and the target block to have its parent list include the current block, i.e.
○ BMap(PMap(i)).succs ∪ {t}; ○ BMap(PMap(i)).pSucc = t; and ○ BMap(t).parents ∪ {PMap(i)}
• P [i] is Conditional jump (ifeq t) : since there will be 2 successors from this instruction, the current block will have additional 2 successors block and both of the blocks will also update their parents list to include the current block, i.e.
is Return : just add the return block as the current block successors, and also update the parent of return block to include the current block, i.e.
is one of the object manipulation instruction. The idea is that the next instruction will be the primary successor of this block, and should there be exception handler(s) associated with this block, they will be added as successors as well. We are making a little bit of simplification here where we add the next instruction as the block's successor directly, i.e.
.parents ∪ {PMap(i)}; and ○ for each exception handler j associated with i, let intP C = maxLabel + j.handlerPC and hP C = j.handlerPC:
BMap(hP C).parents ∪ {intP C} In the original dx tool, they add a new block to contain a pseudo instruction in between the current instruction and the next instruction, which will be removed anyway during translation
here is similar to that of object manipulation, where the next instruction is primary successor, and the exception handler for this instruction are added as successors as well. The difference lies in that where the additional block is bypassed in object manipulation instruction, this time we really add a block with an instruction moveresult (if the method is returning a value) with a fresh label l = getAvailableLabel and the sole successor of i + 1. The current block will then have l as it's primary successor, and the next instruction (i+1) will have l added to its list of parents, i.e.
.parents ∪ {l}; and ○ for each exception handler j associated with i, let intP C = maxLabel + j.handlerPC and hP C = j.handlerPC:
is throw instruction. This instruction only add the exception handlers to the block without updating other block's relationship, i.e. if the current block is i, then for each exception handler j associated with i, let intP C = maxLabel + j.handlerPC and hP C = j.handlerPC:
is any other instruction : depending whether the next instruction is a start of a block or not.
○ If the next instruction is a start of a block, then update the successor of the current block to include the block of the next instruction and the parent of the block of the next instruction to include the current block i.e. BMap(PMap(i)).succs ∪ {i + 1}; and BMap(i + 1).parents ∪ {PMap(i)}
○ If the next instruction is not start of a block, then just point the next instruction to have the same pointer as the current block, i.e.
C. Reading Java Bytecodes (Translate) Table   table II in the appendix. A note about these instructions is that during this parsing of JVM bytecodes, the dx translation will also modify the top of the stack for the next instruction. Since the dx translation only happens in verified JVM bytecodes, we can safely assume that these top of the stacks will be consistent (even though an instruction may have a lot of parents, the resulting top of the stack from the parent instruction will be consistent with each other). To improve readability, we abuse the notation r(x) to also mean r x .
D. Ordering Blocks (PickOrder)
The "trace analysis" itself is quite simple in essence, that is for each block we assign an integer denoting the order of appearance of that particular block. Starting from the initial block, we pick the first unordered successor and then keep on tracing until there is no more successor.
After we reached one end, we pick an unordered block and do the "trace analysis" again. But this time we trace its source ancestor first, by tracing an unordered parent block and stop when there is no more unordered parent block or already forming a loop. Algorithm 1 describes how we implement this "trace analysis".
Algorithm 1 PickOrder(blocks)
order ∶= 0; while there is still block x ∈ blocks without order; do var ∶= P ickStartingP oint(x, {x}); order = T raceSuccessors(source, order); return order;
• Pick Starting Point
This function is a recursive function with an auxiliary data structure to prevent ancestor loop from viewpoint of block x. On each recursion, we pick a parent p from x which primary successor is x, not yet ordered,
and not yet in the loop. The function then return PickStartingPoint(p).
Algorithm 2 PickStartingPoint(x, loop)
for all p ∈ BM ap(x).parents do if p ∈ loop then return x; bp = BMap(p); if bp.pSucc = x and bp.order = −1 then loop = loop ∪ {p}; return PickStartingPoint(p, loop) return order;
• Trace Successors
This function is also a recursive function with an argument of block x. It starts by assigning the current order o to x then increment o by 1. Then it does recursive call to TraceSuccessors giving one successor of x which is not yet ordered as the argument (giving priority to the primary successor of x if there is one).
Algorithm 3 TraceSuccessors(x, order)
BM ap(x).order = order; if BM ap(x).psucc ≠ −1 then pSucc = BMap(x).pSucc; if BM ap(pSucc).order = −1 then return T raceSuccessors(pSucc, order + 1); for all s ∈ BM ap(x).succs do if BM ap(pSucc).order = −1 then return T raceSuccessors(s, order + 1); return order;
E. Output DEX Instructions (Output)
Since the translation phase already translated the JVM instruction and ordered the block, this phase basically just output the instructions in order of the block. Nevertheless, there are some housekeeping to do alongside producing output of instructions.
• Remember the program counter for the first instruction in the block within DEX program. This is mainly useful for fixing up the branching target later on.
• Add gotos to the successor when needed for each of the block that is not ending in branch instruction like goto or if. The main reason to do this is to maintain the successor relation in the case where the next block in order is not the expected block. More specifically, this is step here is in order to satisfy the property B.1.
• Instantiate the return block.
• Reading the list of DEX instructions and fix up the target of jump instructions.
• Collecting information about exception handlers. It is done by sweeping through the block in ordered fashion, inspecting the exception handlers associated with each block. We assume that the variable DEXHandler is a global variable that store the information about exception handler in the DEX bytecode. The function newHandler(cS, cE, hP C, t) will create a new handler (for DEX) with cS as the start PC, cE as the end PC, hP C as the handler PC, and t as the type of exception caught by this new handler.
Algorithm 4 makeHandlerEntry(cH, cS, cE)
for all handler h ∈ cH do hP C = h.handlerP C; t = h.catchT ype; DEXHandler = DEXHandler + newHandler(cS, cE, hP C, t);
The only information that are needed to produce the information about exception handlers in DEX is the basic blocks contained in BMap. The procedure translateExceptionHandlers (Algorithm 5) take these basic blocks blocks and make use the procedure makeHandlerEntry to create the exception handlers in DEX. A note about the last make entry is that the algorithm will leave one set of handlers hanging at the end of loop, therefore we need to make that set of handlers into entry in the DEX exception handlers.
For simplicity, we overload the length of instructions list to also mean the total length of instructions contained in the list. The operator + here is also taken to mean list append operation. The function oppositeCondition takes an ifeq(r, t) and returns its opposite ifneq(r, t). Finally, we assume that the target of jump instruction can be accessed using the field target, e.g. ifeq(r, t).target = t. The details of the steps in this phase is contained in Algorithm 6. 
Ifeq may be translated into Ifneq on certain condition
region, se, i ⊢ norm rt ⇒ rt ⊕ {r ↦ k} Arraylength Arraylength 
A. Proofs that Translation Preserves SOAP Satisfiability
We first start this section with proofs of lemmas that are omitted in the paper due to space requirement. 
Proof: To prove this lemma, we first unfold the definition of compilation. Using the information that a ↦ b, there are several possible cases to output the block depending whether what instruction is Ins a and where a and b are located. Either:
• b are placed directly after a and a [n − 1] is sequential instruction;
In this case, appealing to the definition of successor relation this trivially holds as the first case.
• Ins a ends in a sequential instruction and will have a goto instruction appended that points to b [0] ; Again appealing to the definition of successor relation this trivially holds as the second case, where
• Ins a [n − 1] is a branching instruction and b is one of its child, and b is placed directly after a or is pointed to by the branching instruction; Either case, using the definition of successor relation to establish that we are in the first case.
• Ins a [n−1] is a branching instruction and b is one of its child, nevertheless b is not placed directly after a nor is pointed to by the branching instruction; In this case, according to the Output phase, a goto instruction will be appended in ( a [n−1] +1) and thus we are in the second case. Use the definition of successor relation to conclude the proof. is non-empty (we can justify this successor chain as instruction that cause branching will never be translated into empty sequence). If a ↦ b, then either
We use induction on the length of successor's chain. In the base case where the length is 0, we can use Lemma B.1 to establish that this lemma holds. For the case where the length is n + 1, there are two possibilities for the last instruction in the chain :
• the successor is the next instruction
In this case using the definition of successor relation we know that it will be in the first case.
• the successor is not the next instruction Since there will be a goto appended, it will fall to the second case. Using the successor relation we know that the latter property holds.
then use IH to conclude.
Lemma (VII.1). SOAP properties are preserved in the translation from JVM to DEX.
Proof: We do prove by exhaustion, that is if the original JVM bytecode satisfies SOAP, then the resulting translation to DEX instructions will also satisfy each of the property.
SOAP1. Since the JVM bytecode satisfies SOAP, that
means i is a branching point which will also be translated into a sequence of instruction. Denote i b as the program point in the sequence and is a branching point. and Lemma B.4 we will get that j n ↦ k 1 . Now since the JVM bytecode satisfies SOAP, we know that there are two cases we need to take care of and k will fall to one case or the other. Assume k ∈ region(i, τ ), that means using Definition VII.2 we will have k 1 ∈ region(i n , τ ). Assume k = jun(i, τ ), we use Definition VII.6 and obtain that k 1 = jun(i n , τ ). Either way, SOAP property is preserved for SOAP2. Similar argument as SOAP1 to establish the second case of Lemma B.1, and that the property is still preserved in the presence of moveresult and moveexception. SOAP3. Trivial SOAP4. Let k 1 = jun(i, τ 1 ) and k 2 = jun(i, τ 2 ) (this may be a bit confusing, this program point here refers to the program point in JVM bytecode). Let i b be the instruction in i that branch and k 11 and k 21 be the first instruction in P [k 1 ] and P [k 2 ] respectively. We proceed by using Definition VII.2 and the knowledge that the JVM bytecode satisfy SOAP4 to establish that when k 11 ≠ k 21 , then
the DEX program will also satisfy SOAP4. SOAP5. For any jun(i, τ ′ ) such that it is defined, let program point k = jun(i, τ ′ ). Using Definition VII.6 we have k 1 = jun(i n , τ ′ ). Using Definition VII.2, we know that k 1 ∈ region(i n , τ ). If we then set k 1 to be such point, where jun(i n , τ ′ ) and jun(i n , τ ′ ) ∈ region(i n , τ ) for any τ ′ with junction point defined, the property then holds. SOAP6. Is similar to the way proving SOAP5, with the addition of simple property where the size of a code and its translation is covariant in a sense that if an program a has more codes than b, then a also has more codes than b .
B. Proof that Translation Preserves Typability
To prove the typability preservation of the compilation processes, we define an intermediate type system closely resembles that of DEX, except that the addressing is using block addressing. The purpose of this intermediate addressing is to know the existence of registers typing to satisfy typability and the constraint satisfaction for each instructions. We omit the details to avoid more clutters.
Following monotony lemma is useful in proving the relation of ⊑ between registers typing obtained from compiling stack types.
Lemma B.5 (Monotonicity of Translation). Let rt be a register types and S 1 and S 2 stack types. If we have rt ⊑ S 1 and S 1 ⊑ S 2 , then rt ⊑ S 2 as well.
Proof: Trivial based on the definition of . and the ⊑ for register types.
Lemma (VII.3).
For any JVM program P with instruction Ins at address i and tag Norm, let the length of Ins denoted by n. Let RT i [0] = S i . If according to the transfer rule for
according to the transfer rule(s) of Ins
Proof: It is case by case instruction, although for most of the instructions they are straigthforward as they only translate into one instruction. For the rest of the proof, using definition VII.7 to say that the translated se( i ) have the same security level as se(i).
• Push
We appeal directly to both of the transfer rule of Push and Const. In Push case, it only appends top of the stack with se(i). Let such rt be
referring to Const transfer rule. Since Push is translated into Const(r(T S i )), where T S i corresponds to the top of the stack, we know that st = rt because RT i [0] = S i and the rt we have is the same as se(i) ∶∶ S i thus rt ⊑ st
• Pop
In this case, since the instruction does not get translated, this instruction does not affect the lemma.
• Load x Similar to Push except that the security value pushed on top of the stack is se( i [0]) ⊔ ⃗ k a (x). And although there are several transfer rules for move, there is only one applicable because the source register comes from local variable register, and the target register is one of the stack space. Using this transfer rule, we can trivially show that rt = st where
• Store x This instruction is also translated as move except that the source register is the top of the stack and the target register is one of the local variable register. The rt in this case will be
This rt coincides with the transfer rule for move where the target register is a register used to contain local variable. Since we know that the x is in the range of local variable, we will have that rt ⊑ st based on the definition of ⊑, . of flattening a stack.
• Goto This instruction does not get translated just like Pop, so this instruction also does not affect the lemma.
• Ifeq t This instruction is translated to conditional branching in the DEX instruction. There are two things happened to the stack types, one is that the removal of the top value of the stack which is justified by the definition of ⊑, and then lifting the value of the rest of the stack. Let
Since the lift does not affect registers in the local variable side, we know that for all registers r ∈ locR, rt(r) = ⃗ k a (r) so they coincide. For registers in the stack space, since they are the lub of values originally the same RT i [0] = S i , with a value that is the same for both (RT i [0] r(T S i − 1) = S i [0]) , therefore the resulting registers type will also be the same, i.e. rt ⊑ lift k (st ′ ) where S i = k ∶∶ st ′ .
• Binop Translated as a DEX instruction for specified binary operator with the source taken from the top two values from the stack, and then put the resulting value in the then would be top of the stack. Let rt in this case comes from
This rt corresponds to the scheme of DEX transfer rule for binary operation. Then we will have that rt ⊑ st where
• Swap In dx tool, this instruction is translated into 4 move instructions. In this case, such rt is 
′ . There's a slight subtlety here in that the relation might not hold due to the presence of se in rt whereas there is no such occurrence in st. But on a closer look, we know that in the case of swap instruction, the effect of se will be nothing. There are two cases to consider:
○ If the value in the operand stacks are already there before se is modified. We know that this can be the case only when there was a conditional branch before, which also means that the operand stacks will be lifted to the level of the guard and the level of se is determined by this level of the guard as well. So practically, they are the same thing ○ If the value in the operand stacks are put after se is modified. Based on the transfer rules of the instructions that put a value on top of the stack, they will lub se with the values, therefore another lub with se will have no effect. For the first property, we have these registers typing
which satisfy the property.
• New The argument that goes for this instruction is exactly the same as that of Push, where the rt in this case is S i ⊕ {r(T S i ) ↦ se( i [0])}.
• Getfield In this case, the transfer rule for the translated instruction coincides with the transfer rule for Getfield. Let
Then we have rt = st which can be trivially shown with st = se(i) ⊔ ft(f ) ∶∶ S i thus giving us rt ⊑ st .
• Putfield Since the JVM transfer rule for the operation itself only removes the top 2 stack, and the transfer rule for DEX keep the registers typing, when we have rt = S i , then by the definition of ⊑ we'll have rt ⊑ st since S i = k o ∶∶ k v ∶∶ st. As before, the registers that is not contained in the stack will by definition satisfy the ⊑ by Lemma VII.2.
• Newarray Similar to the argument of load, we have
which will give us rt ⊑ st .
•
. In this case
which coincides with st where st = (k⊔k i )⊔ ext k c ∶∶ st ′ and S i = k i ∶∶ k[k c ] ∶∶ st ′ except for lub with se(i). The similar reasoning with Swap where lub with se(i) in this case will have no effect.
• Arraystore Similar argument with putfield where the JVM instruction remove top of the stack and DEX instruction preserves the registers typing for rt. Thus appealing to the definition of ⊑ we have that rt ⊑ st .
• Invoke This instruction itself yield 1 or 2 instructions depending whether the function returns a value or not. Since the assumption for JVM type system is that functions always return a value, the translation will be that invoke and moveresult except that moveresult will always be in the region Norm.
→ ⃗ k ′ r be the policy for method invoked. Type system wise, there will be 3 different cases for this instruction, normal execution, caught, and uncaught exception. For this lemma, the only one applicable is normal execution since it is the one tagged with Norm. There will be 2 resulting instructions since it will also contain the instruction moveresult. Let st 1 be the stack containing the function's arguments, t be the top of the stack after popping the function arguments from the stack and the object reference t = locN + (length(S i ) − length(st 1 ) − 1), where locN is the number of local variables. Let k be the security level of object referenced and k e = ⊔ ⃗ k ′ r [e] e ∈ excAnalysis(m ID ). Since the method can also throw an exception, we have to also include the lub of security level for possible exceptions, denoted by k e . In this case, such rt can be
and by definition of ⊑ we will have that rt ⊑ st , where
With that form of rt in mind, then the registers typing for i [1] can be
) coming from the the transfer rule of invoke in DEX.
• Throw This lemma will never apply to Throw since if the exception is caught, then the successor will be in the tag τ ≠ Norm, but if the exception is uncaught then the instruction is a return point.
Lemma (VII.4). For any JVM program P with instruction
Ins at address i and tag τ ≠ Norm with exception handler at address i e . Let the length of Ins until the instruction that throw exception τ denoted by n. Let (be, 0) = i e be the address of the handler for that particular exception. If according to the transfer rule for Proof: Case by case possibly throwing instructions:
• Invoke We only need to take care of the case where the exception is caught, as uncaught exception is a return point therefore there is no successor. In this case, n = 1 as the instruction that may throw is the invoke itself, therefore the first property trivially holds (moveexception can't possibly throw an exception). Let locN in this case be the number of local variables, and e be the exception thrown. Let k be the security level of object referenced. In this case, the last rt will take the form
)} Again with this rt we will have rt ⊑ st , where
∶∶ . Such rt is obtained from the transfer rule for invoke where an exception of tag τ is thrown, and the transfer rule for moveexception. Then we have the registers typing for (be, 0) as
)} which fulfills the second property (transfer rule from invoke) and the last property, which when joined with the transfer rule for moveexception will give us the rt that we want.
• Throw
The argument follows that of Invoke for the caught and uncaught exception. For uncaught exception, there is nothing to prove here as there is no resulting st. For caught exception, let k be the security level of the exception and locN be the number of local variable. Such rt can be
and it will make the relation rt ⊑ st holds, where st = (k ⊔ se(i)) ∶∶ . This rt comes from the transfer rules for throw and moveexception combined. Registers typing for (be, 0) takes the form of
which will give us the final rt that we want after the transfer rule for moveexception
• Other possibly throwing instruction Essentially they are the same as that of throw where the security level that we are concerned with is the security level of the object lub-ed with its security environment. The will also come from the transfer rule of each respective instruction throwing a null pointer exception combined with the rule for moveexception.
Lemma (VII.5). Let ins be instruction at address i, i ↦ j, st, S i and S j be stack types such that i ⊢ S i ⇒ st, st ⊑ S j . Let n be the length of ins . Let Proof: We do this by case by case instruction:
This instruction is translated into Const which does not have any constraints.
• Pop: does not get translated.
• Load x This instruction is translated into Move which does not have any constraints.
• Store x This instruction is translated into Move which does not have any constraints.
• Goto: does not get translated
• Ifeq t This instruction will get translated to ifeq instruction where the condition is based on top of the stack (T S i − 1). There is only one constraint of the form ∀j ′ ∈ region(i, Norm), rt r(T S i − 1) ≤ se(j ′ ), and we know that in the JVM bytecode the constraint ∀j ′ ∈ region(i, Norm), k ≤ se(j ′ ) is fulfilled. Based on the definition of . , we will have k = rt r(T S i − 1) . Thus we only need to prove that the difference in region will still preserve the constraint satisfaction. We do this by proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists such instruction at address (bj, j) ∈ region( i [n]) such that k ≰ se(bj, j). But according to definition VII.2, such instruction will come from an instruction at address i ′ s.t. i ′ ∈ region(i) thus it will satisfy k ≤ se(i ′ ). By definition VII.7, se(bj, j) = se(i ′ ), thus we will have k ≤ se(bj, j). A plain contradiction.
• Binop
This instruction is translated into Binop or BinopConst both of which does not have any constraints.
• Swap Trivially holds as well because all the 4 move instructions translated from swap do not have any constraints.
• New Trivially holds as the New does not have any constraints.
• Getfield There are different sets of constraints depending on whether the instruction executes normally, throw a caught exception, or throw an uncaught exception. In the case of Getfield executing normally, there are only two constraints that we need to take care, one is that rt(r o ) ∈ S and ∀j ∈ region(i, Norm), rt(r o ) ≤ se(j). The first constraint is trivial, since we already have that in JVM the constraint k ∈ S is satisfied, where S i = k ∶∶ st for some stack type st. We know that based on the definition of S i we have rt(r o ) = k, therefore we can conclude that rt(r o ) ∈ S. The second constraint follows similar argument to the satisfaction of region constraint in Ifeq.
In the case of Getfield is throwing an exception, we then know that based on the compilation scheme, depending on whether the exception is caught or not, the same thing will apply to the translated instruction iget, i.e. if Getfield has a handler for np, so does iget and if Getfield does not have a handler for np, iget does not either. Thus we only need to take care of one more constraint in that if this instruction does throw an uncaught exception, then it will satisfy rt(r o ) ≤ ⃗ k r [np]. This constraint is also trivially holds as the policy is translated directly, i.e. ⃗ k r [np] is the same both in JVM type system and DEX type system, and that rt(r o ) = k. Since JVM typing satisfy k ≤ ⃗ k r [np], then so does DEX typing.
• Putfield To prove the constraint satisfaction for this instruction we appeal to the translation scheme and the definition of . . We know from the translation scheme that the resulting instruction is iput(r(T S i − 1), r(T S i − 2), f ), so the top of the stack (T S i − 1) corresponds to r s and the second to top of the stack (T S i − 2) corresponds to r o . From the JVM transfer rule, we know that the security level of
is in the set of S ext and the security level of S i [1] is in the set of S. Thus we know then know that the constraints rt(r o ) ∈ S and rt(r s ) ∈ S ext are fulfilled since we have rt(T S i − 1) = S i [0] and rt(T S i − 2) = S i [1] . Now for constraints k h ≤ ft(f ) and, (rt(r o ) ⊔ se(i)) ⊔ ext rt(r s ) ≤ ft(f ) we know that the policies are translated directly, thus the constraint k h ≤ ft(f ) trivially holds. For the other constraint, we know that k 1 = rt(r s ), k 2 = rt(r o ), and se stays the same, therefore the constraint (rt(r o )⊔se(i))⊔ ext rt(r s ) ≤ ft(f ) is also satisfied because (k 2 ⊔ se(i)) ⊔ ext k 1 ≤ ft(f ) is assumed to be satisfied. Lastly, for the rest of the constraints refer to the proof in Getfield as they are essentially the same (the constraint for region, handler's existence / non-existence, and constraint against ⃗ k r on uncaught exception).
• Newarray Trivially holds as the instruction Newarray does not have any constraints.
• Arraylength We first deal with the constraints k ∈ S and k c ∈ S ext . From the definition of . , we know that rt(r a ) = k[k c ]. Since JVM typing satisfies these constraints, it follows that DEX typing also satisfies this constraints. For the rest of the constraints refer to the proof in Getfield as they are essentially the same (the constraint for region, handler's existence / non-existence, and constraint against ⃗ k r on uncaught exception).
• Arrayload We first deal with the constraints k, rt(r i ) ∈ S and k c ∈ S ext . From the definition of . , we know that rt(r a ) = k 2 [k c ] and rt(r i ) = k 1 . Since we know that JVM typing satisfies all the constraint, we know that rt(r i ) ∈ S since k 1 ∈ S, k ∈ S since k 2 ∈ S, and k c ∈ S ext since in JVM typing k c ∈ S ext . For the rest of the constraints refer to the proof in Getfield as they are essentially the same (the constraint for region, handler's existence / non-existence, and constraint against ⃗ k r on uncaught exception).
• Arraystore Similar to that of Putfield, where rt(r s ) = k 1 , rt(r i ) = k 2 , and
ext . In this setting as well, it is easy to show that DEX typing satisfies
For the rest of the constraints refer to the proof in Getfield as they are essentially the same (the constraint for region, handler's existence / non-existence, and constraint against ⃗ k r on uncaught exception).
• Invokevirtual There will be 3 different cases for this instruction, the first case is when method invocation executes normally. According to the translation scheme, the object reference will be put in ⃗ p[0] and the rest of parameters are arranged to match the arguments to the method call. This way, we will have the correspondence that rt(⃗ p[0]) = k, and ∀i ∈ [0, length(
Since the policies and se are translated directly, we will have rt(
. Similar argument applies to the rest of parameters to the method call to establish that ∀i ∈ [1, length(
For the last constraint, we know that excAnalysis also gets translated directly, thus yielding the same k e for both JVM and DEX. Following the argument of Getfield for the region constraint, we only need to make sure that rt(⃗ p[0]) ⊔ k e = k ⊔ k e which is the case in our setting. Therefore, we will have that constraint ∀j ∈ region(i, Norm).rt(⃗ p[0]) ⊔ k e ≤ se(j) is satisfied. The second case is when method invocation thrown a caught exception. Basically the same arguments as that of normal execution, except that the region condition is based upon particular exception ∀j ∈ region(i, e). rt(⃗ p[0]) ⊔ k ′ r [e] ≤ se(j). Since the policy stays the same, JVM instruction satisfy this constraint will imply that the DEX instruction will also satisfy the constraint. Since now the method is throwing an exception, we also need to make sure that it is within the possible thrown exception defined in excAnalysis. Again as the class stays the same and that excAnalysis is the same, the satisfaction of e ∈ excAnalysis(m ID ) ⊔ {np} in JVM side implies the satisfaction of e ∈ excAnalysis(m ′ ) ⊔ {np} in DEX side. The last case is when method invocation thrown an uncaught exception. Same argument as the caught exception with the addition that escaping exception are contained within the method's policy. Since we
in the JVM side, it will also imply that rt(
in the DEX side since rt(⃗ p[0]) = k and everything else is the same. Actually there is a possibility that there is addition of moveresult and/or moveexception, except that the target of this instruction will be in the stack space, therefore there will be no constraint involved to satisfy.
• Throw Similar arguments to that of Invokevirtual addressing the similar form of the constraints. In the case of caught exception case, the constraint e ∈ classAnalysis(i) ∪ {np} is satisfied because, as before, classAnalysis and classes (e) are the same. So, if JVM program satisfy the constraint the translated DEX program will also satisfy it. The same with ∀j ∈ region(i, e)rt(r) ≤ se(j) since rt(r) = k. The case where exception is uncaught is the same as the caught case with addition that the security level of thrown exception must be contained within method's policy. In this case, we already have rt(r) ≤ ⃗ k r [e] since rt(r) = k and policies stay the same.
This lemma states that a typable JVM program (block wise and within blocks) will translate into typable DEX program.
Lemma (VII.7). Let P be a JVM program such that ∀i, j.i ↦ j.∃st.i ⊢ S i ⇒ st and st ⊑ S j Then P will be 1) for all blocks bi, bj s.
Proof: For the first property, they are mainly proved using Lemma VII.5 because we know that if a DEX instruction is at the end of a block, it is the last instruction in its translated JVM instruction, except for invoke and throwing instructions. Based on Lemma VII.5, we have that rt ⊑ RT (bj,0) , where RT (bj,0) = S j . Since by definition rt b is such rt and RT s bj = RT (bj,0) , the property holds. For invoke we use the first case of Lemma VII.3, and for throwing instructions we use the first case of Lemma VII.4.
For the second property, it is only possible if the DEX instruction at address i is non-invoke and non-throwing instruction. There are two possible cases here, whether i and j comes from the same JVM instruction or not. If i and j comes from the same JVM instruction, then we use the first case of Lemma VII.3. Otherwise, we use Lemma VII.5.
Before we proceed to the proof of Lemma VII.8, we define a property which is satisfied after the ordering and output phase.
Property B.1. For any block whose next order is not its primary successor, there are two possible cases. If the ending instruction is not ifeq, then there will be a goto instruction appended after the output of that particular block. If the ending instruction is ifeq, check whether the next order is in fact the second branch. If it is the second branch, then we need to "swap" the ifeq instruction into ifneq instruction. Otherwise appends goto to the primary successor block.
Lemma (VII.8). Let P be a typable DEX blocks resulted from translation of JVM instruction still in the block form, i.e.
P = Translate(TraceParentChild(StartBlock(P )))
Proof: The proof of this lemma is straightforward based on the definition of the property and typability. Assuming that initially we have the blocks already typable, then what's left is in ensuring that this successor relation is preserved in the output as well. Since the output is based on the ordering, and the property ensures that for any ordering, all the block will have correct successor, then the typability of the program is preserved.
To flesh out the proof, we go for each possible ending of a block and its program output.
• Sequential instruction There are two possible cases, the first case is that the successor block is the next block in order. Let bi indicate the current block and bj the successor block in question. Let i n be the last instruction in bi, then we know that ∃rt.RT (bi,in) ⇒ rt, rt ⊑ RT s bj where RT s bj will be the registers typing for the next instruction (in another word RT (bj,0) ). Therefore, the typability property trivially holds. The second case is that the successor block is not the next block in order. According to step performed in the Output phase, the property B.1 will be satisfied. Thus there will be a goto appended after instructions in the block output targetting the successor block. Let such block be bi and the successor block bj. Let i n be the last instruction in bi. From the definition of typability, we know that if bj is the next block to output, then ∃rt.RT (bi,in) ⇒ rt, rt ⊑ RT s bj . Now with additional goto in the horizon, we appeal to the transfer rule to establish that this instruction does not need to modify the registers typing, i.e.
• ifeq There are three possible cases here, the first case is that the next block to output is its primary successor. It is trivial as the relationship is preserved in that the next block to output is the primary successor. The next case is that the next block to output is its secondary successor. We switch the instruction to its complementary, i.e. ifneq. Let bi be the current block, bj be the primary successor (which is directly placed after this block), and bk the other successor. Let i n be the index to the last instruction in bi. If bi ends with ifneq, then we know that it is originally from the instruction ifeq and the blocks are typable, therefore we have that for the two successors of bi the following relation holds: ∃rt 1 .i n ⇒ rt 1 , rt 1 ⊑ RT s bj and ∃rt 2 .i n ⇒ rt 2 , rt 2 ⊑ RT s bk , which defines the typability for the output instructions. The last case is when the next block to output is not its successor. The argument is the same as the sequential instruction one, where we know that adding goto can maintain the registers typing thus preserving the typability by fixing the successor relationship. For the secondary successor (target of branching), we know that there is a step in the output that handles the branch addressing to maintain the successor relations.
• invoke, yet the next block to output is not moveresult Although superficially this seems like a possibility, the fact that moveresult is added corresponding to a unique invoke renders the case impossible. If moveresult is not yet ordered, we know that it will be the next to output based on the ordering scheme. This is the only way that a moveresult can be given an order, so it is impossible to order a moveresult before ordering its unique invoke.
APPENDIX C FULL JVM OPERATIONAL SEMANTICS AND TRANSFER RULES
The following figure 7 is the full operational semantics for JVM in section III. The function fresh ∶ Heap → L is an allocator function that given a heap returns the location for that object. The function default ∶ C → O returns for each class a default object of that class. For every field of that default object, the value will be 0 if the field is numeric type, and null if the field is of object type. Similarly defaultArray ∶ N × T J → (N ⇀ V). The ↝ relation which defines transition between state is ↝⊆ State × (State + V × Heap).
The operator ⊕ denotes the function where ρ ⊕ {r ↦ v} means a new function ρ ′ such that ∀i ∈ dom(ρ) {r}.ρ ′ (i) = ρ(i) and ρ ′ (r) = v. The operator ⊕ is overloaded to also mean the update of a field on an object, or update on a heap.
For method invocation, program comes equipped with a set M of method names, and for each method m there are associated list of instructions P m . Each method is identified by method identifier m ID which can refer to several methods in the case of overriding. Therefore we also need to know which class this method is invoked from, which can be identified by auxilliary function lookup P which returns the precise method to be executed based on the method identifier and class.
To handle exception, program will also comes equipped with two parameters classAnalysis and excAnalysis. classAnalysis contains information on possible classes of exception of a program point, and excAnalysis contains possible escaping exception of a method.
There is also additional partial function for method m Handler m ∶ PP × C ⇀ PP which gives the handler address for a given program point and exception. Given a program point i and an exception thrown c, if Handler m (i, c) = t then the control will be transferred to program point t, if the handler is undefined (noted Handler m (i, c) ↑) then the exception is uncaught in method m.
The next figure 8 is the full version of figure 3 in section III. The full typing judgement takes the form of Γ, ft, region, sgn, se, i ⊢ τ st ⇒ st ′ where Γ is the table of method policies, ft is the global policy for fields, region is the CDR information for the current method, sgn is the policy for the current method taking the form of ⃗ k a k h → ⃗ k r , se is the security environment, i is the current program point, st is the stack typing for the current instruction, and st ′ is the stack typing after the instruction is executed.
As in the main paper, we may not write the full notation whenever it is clear from the context. In the table of operational semantics, we may drop the subscript m, Norm from ↝, e.g. we may write ↝ instead of ↝ m,Norm to mean the same thing. In the table of transfer rules, we may drop the superscript of tag from ⊢ τ and write ⊢ instead. The same case applies to the typing judgement, we may write i
⟨i, ρ, l ∶∶ os, h⟩ ↝ m,e ⟨t, ρ, l ∶∶ , h⟩ The following figure 9 is the full operational semantics for DEX in section IV. It is similar to that of JVM, with several differences, e.g. the state in DEX does not have operand stack but its functionality is covered by the registers (local variables) ρ. The function fresh ∶ Heap → L is an allocator function that given a heap returns the location for that object. The function default ∶ C → O returns for each class a default object of that class. For every field of that default object, the value will be 0 if the field is numeric type, and null if the field is of object type. Similarly defaultArray ∶ N × T D → (N ⇀ V). The ↝ relation which defines transition between state is ↝⊆ State × (State + V × Heap).
The next figure 10 is the full version of figure 6 in section IV. The full typing judgement takes the form of Γ, ft, region, sgn, se, i ⊢ τ rt ⇒ rt ′ where Γ is the table of method policies, ft is the global policy for fields, region is the CDR information for the current method, sgn is the policy for the current method taking the form of ⃗ k a k h → ⃗ k r , se is the security environment, i is the current program point, rt is the register typing for the current instruction, rt ′ is the register typing after the instruction is executed.
⟨i, ρ, h⟩ ↝ ⟨t, ρ, h⟩ 
and l 2 = fresh(h 2 ) then the following properties hold
Lemma E.7. ρ 1 ∼ rt1,rt2,β ρ 2 implies for any register r ∈ ρ 1 :
• either rt 1 (r) = rt 2 (r), rt 1 (r) ≤ k obs and ρ 1 (r) ∼ β ρ 2 (r)
• or rt 1 (r) ≰ k obs and rt 2 (r) ≰ k obs
APPENDIX F PROOF THAT TYPABLE DEX I IMPLIES NON-INTERFERENCE
In this appendix, we present the soundness of our type system for DEX program i.e. typable DEX program implies that the program is safe. We also base our proof construction on the work Barthe et. al., including the structuring of the submachine. In the paper, we present the type system for the aggregate of the submachines. In the proof construction, we will have 4 submachines: standard instruction without modifying the heap (DEX I ), object and array instructions (DEX O ), method invocation (DEX C ), and exception mechanism (DEX G ).
There are actually more definitions on indistinguishability that would be required to establish that typability implies noninterference. Before we go to the definition of operand stack indistinguishability, there is a definition of high registers : let ρ ∈ (R ⇀ V) be register mapping and rt ∈ (R → S) be a registers typing; we write high(ρ, rt) if ρ and rt have the same domain and rt(x) ≰ k obs for every x.
Several notes here in this submachine, since the execution is always expected to return normally, the form of the policy for return value only takes the form of k r instead of ⃗ k r . There is also no need to involve the heap and β mapping, therefore we will drop them from the proofs.
Definition F.1 (State indistinguishability). Two states ⟨i, ρ⟩ and ⟨i
be two DEX I states at the same program point i and let two registers types rt 1 , rt 2 ∈ (R → S) such that s 1 ∼ ⃗ ka,rt1,rt2 s 2 .
• Let s
Proof: By contradiction. Assume that all the precedent are true, but the conclusion is false. That means, s • move(r, r s ). This case is trivial, as the distinguishability for ρ s ′ 1 and ρ s ′ 2 will depend only on the source register. If the source register is low, then since we have that ρ 1 ∼ ρ 2 , they have to have the same value (ρ 1 (r s ) = ρ 2 (r s )), therefore the value put in r will be the same as well. If the source register is high, then the target register will have high security level as well (the security of both values will be rt(r s ) ⊔ se(i), where rt(r s ) ≰ k obs ), thus preserving the indistinguishability.
• binop(r, r a , r b ). Following the argument from move, the distinguishability for ρ s ′ 1 and ρ s ′ 2 will depend only on the source registers. If source registers are low, then since we have that ρ 1 ∼ ρ 2 , they have to have the same values (ρ 1 (r a ) = ρ 2 (r a ) and ρ 1 (r b ) = ρ 2 (r b )), therefore the result of binary operation will be the same (no change in indistinguishability). If any of the source register is high, then the target register will have high security level as well (the security level of the resulting value will be rt(r a ) ⊔ rt(r b ) ⊔ se(i), where rt(r a ) ≰ k obs and/or rt(r b ) ≰ k obs ), thus preserving the indistinguishability.
• const(r, v). Nothing to prove here, the instruction will always give the same value anyway, regardless whether the security level of the register to store the value is high or low.
• goto(j). Nothing to prove here, as the instruction only modify the program counter.
• return(r s ). This is a slightly different case here than before, where we are comparing the results instead of the state (v 1 ∼ v 2 ). Again, the reasoning is that to have different result and they are distinguishable, we need the register from which the value is returned to be high (rt(r s ) ≰ k obs ), but the security level of the return value of the method is low (k r ≤ k obs ). But this is already taken care of by the transfer rule which state rt(r s ) ≤ k r . Therefore, a contradiction.
• ifeq(r, t). A special case where there might be a branching thus the states compared are at two different program counters. If the register used in comparison is low (rt(r) ≤ k obs ), we know that the program counter will be the same and there will be nothing left to prove (ifeq is just modifying program counter). If the register is high (rt(r) ≰ k obs ), the operational semantics tells us that there is no modification to the registers. Therefore, register wise these two states are indistinguishable.
Lemma F.2 (Step Consistent). Let ⟨i, ρ⟩, s 0 ∈ State I be two DEX I states and two registers types rt, rt 0 ∈ (R → S) such that ⟨i, ρ⟩ ∼ ⃗ ka,rt,rt0 s 0 , se(i) ≰ k obs
• If there exists a state ⟨i ′ , ρ ′ ⟩ ∈ State I and a registers type rt
• If there exists a value v ∈ V s.t. ⟨i, ρ⟩ ↝ v and i ⊢ rt ⇒ then k r ≰ k obs Proof: By contradiction. Assume that all the precedent are true, but the conclusion is false. That means, ⟨i ′ , ρ ′ ⟩ is distinguishable from s 0 , which means that ρ ′ ≁ ρ 0 . We will do this by case for possible instructions :
• move(r, r s ). In this case, it's trivial because the security level of r will at least be as high as se(i) thus whatever value we modify the stack with will have high as least upper bound, hence the resulting register type will be indistinguishable if initially it was indistinguishable (adding a high value will not change indistinguishability).
• binop(r, r a , r b ). Follows from the move instruction, it's trivial because the security level of r will at least be as high as se(i) thus whatever value we modify the stack with will have high as least upper bound, hence the resulting register type will be indistinguishable if initially it was indistinguishable (adding a high value will not change indistinguishability).
• const(r, v). Follows from the assumption that se(i) is high.
• ifeq(r, j). Nothing to prove here, as the instruction only modify the program counter.
• return(r s ). In this instance, we only need to make sure that the returned value is high (i.e. k r ≰ k obs ) if the assumption holds. This is taken care of by the transfer rule, which states that se(i) ≤ k r which means that since se(i) is high (by assumption), the returned value must high as well (k r ≰ k obs ) to be typable (i ⊢ rt ⇒). 
Lemma F.3 (High Branching
Proof: This is already by definition of the branching instruction (ifeq and ifneq). se(i) will be high because r will by definition be high. This level can not be low, because if the level is low, then the register r is low and by the definition of indistinguishability will have to have the same values, and therefore will take the same program counter. Since se is high for scope of the region, we have ∀j ∈ region(i), se(j) ≰ k obs .
Lemma F.4 (indistinguishablility double monotony). if s ∼ ⃗ ka,S,T t, S ⊑ U , and T ⊑ U then s ∼ ⃗ ka,U,U t Lemma F.5 (indistinguishablility single monotony). if s ∼ k obs ,S,T t, S ⊑ S ′ and S is high then s ∼ k obs ,S ′ ,T t
Having established the appropriated lemmas, we sketch the proof of type system soundness. This proof follows closely to the one in the original paper. In the induction step (base case is that if it's typable, then no direct flows), we have two executions s 0 ↝ ... ↝ s n and s We assume the property holds for any strictly shorter execution paths (induction hypothesis) and suppose n > 0 and m > 0. We note i 0 = pc(s 0 ) = pc(s ′ 0 ). Using Lemma F.1 and typability hypothesis, we have s 1 ∼ rt,rt ′ s ′ 1 for some registers types rt and rt -If pc(s 1 ) ≠ pc(s ′ 1 ) (it is from a branching point, and it is high, as the low will fall into previous case) we know by the Lemma F.3 that se is high in region region(i 0 ). By SOAP 1 we know that pc(s 1 ) ∈ region(i 0 ) or pc(s 1 ) = jun(i 0 ), then going for induction on the path s 1 ↝ ... ↝ s n (using SOAP2) we know that either there exists k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n s.t. k = jun(i 0 ) and using the help of Lemma F.2 to get s k ∼ RT pc(s k ) ,RTi 0 s ′ 0 (high path reaches junction point) or pc(s n ) ∈ region(i 0 ) and s n ∼ RT pc(sn ) ,RTi 0 s ′ 0 A similar property holds for the other execution path. We can group two cases here :
• jun(i 0 ) is defined and there exists k, k
we have by transitivity and symmetry of ∼,
and we can conclude by induction hypothesis.
• jun(i 0 ) is undefined and both RT pc(sn) and RT pc(s ′ m ) are high
To reduce clutter, we only formally prove non-interference of the last submachine where all the features are included. The proof will resemble the proof sketched in this submachine and can be appropriated for another submachines as well.
APPENDIX G PROOF THAT TYPABLE DEX O IMPLIES NON-INTERFERENCE
Indistinguishability between states can be defined with the additional definition of heap indistinguishability, so we do not need additional indistinguishability definition. In the DEX O part, we only need to appropriate the lemmas used to establish the proof.
Definition G.1 (State indistinguishability). Two states ⟨i, ρ, h⟩ and ⟨i ′ , ρ ′ , h ′ ⟩ are indistinguishable w.r.t. a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L, and two registers typing rt, rt
Lemma G.1 (Locally Respects). Let β a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L, s 1 , s 2 ∈ State O be two DEX O states at the same program point i and let two registers types rt 1 , rt 2 ∈ (R → S) such that s 1 ∼ ⃗ ka,rt1,rt2,β s 2 .
Proof: By contradiction. Assume that all the precedent are true, but the conclusion is false. That means, s • assume h ○ iput(r s , r o , f ) can only cause the difference by putting different values (ρ 1 (r s ) ≠ ρ 2 (r s )) with rt 1 (r s ) ≰ k obs and rt 2 (r s ) ≰ k obs on a Lemma I.6 (Iterated Step Consistent). Let β a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L, ⟨i 0 , ρ 0 , h 0 ⟩, ⟨i, ρ, h⟩ ∈ State G two states of DEX G and a registers type rt ∈ (R → S). s.t.
Let i ∈ P P and τ ∈ {Norm} + C s.t.
Suppose we have a derivation
and suppose this derivation is typable w.r.t. RT . Then one of the following cases holds :
1) jun(i, τ ) is defined and there exists j with 0 < j ≤ k s.t.
i j = jun(i, τ ), ⟨i j , ρ j , h j ⟩ ∼ RTi j ,rt,β ⟨i, ρ, h⟩ 2) jun(i, τ ) is undefined, k ∈ region(i, τ ), h ′ ∼ β h and highResult kr (v, h ′ )
Proof: By induction on k.
• k = 0 we can use SOAP3 to conclude that jun(i, τ ) is undefined (i 0 ∈ region(i, τ ) and i 0 is a return point) and apply case 2 of Lemma I.5 to conclude the rest of case 2
• suppose the statement is true for a given k and try to prove it for k + 1. From the assumption that i 0 ∈ region(i, τ ) we have that se(i 0 ) ≰ k obs . Combining with the typability definition (i 0 ⊢ RT i0 ⇒ rt ′ 1 hold for some rt ′ 1 ⊑ RT i1 ), so we have ⟨i 1 , ρ 1 , h 1 ⟩ ∼ rt ′ 1 ,rt,β ⟨i, ρ, h⟩ by case 1 of Lemma I.5. Then, using SOAP2, we have i 1 ∈ region(i, τ ) or jun(i, τ ). In the case where i 1 ∈ region(i, τ ), it is sufficient to invoke induction hypothesis on derivation ⟨i 1 , ρ 1 , h 1 ⟩ ↝ m,τ1 ...⟨i k+1 , ρ k+1 , h k+1 ⟩ ↝ m,τ k+1 (v, h ′ ) to conclude. In the case where i 1 = jun(i, τ ), we can conclude we are in case 1 by taking j = 1 because we know that ⟨i 1 , ρ 1 , h 1 ⟩ ∼ RTi 1 ,rt,β ⟨i, ρ, h⟩ holds.
Since now we have different regions based on tags, there is a possibility that an execution starts from a junction point in some region, but still contained in the other region (thus the step consistent still applies). This lemma is used for the proof for execution starting from a high branching. • If i j = jun(i, τ ) ∈ region(i, τ ′ ), we invoke Lemma I.6 on the derivation ⟨i j , ρ j , h j ⟩ ↝ m,τj ...(r, h) and the region region(i, τ ′ ) to establish that there exists q with j < q ≤ k s.t. ⟩ and we can conclude we are in case 1 with j = q and j ′ = 0. Since we know that the program satisfies SOAP3, the case where k ∈ region(i, τ ′ ) is not possible because then a junction point is defined for a return point.
• If i ⟨i j ′ , ρ j ′ , h j ′ ⟩ ∼ RTi j ′ ,RTi 0 ,β ⟨i 0 , ρ 0 , h 0 ⟩ and we can conclude we are in case 1. Since we know that the program satisfies SOAP3, the case where k ′ ∈ region(i, τ ) is not possible because then a junction point is defined for a return point. 2) jun(i, τ ) is undefined, k ∈ region(i, τ ), highResult kr (r, h) and h ∼ β h ′ 0 . k is a return point in region region(i, τ ) so, thanks to SOAP5, we know that i ′ 0 = jun(i, τ ′ ) ∈ region(i, τ ). We can hence invoke Lemma I.6 lemma on the derivation ⟨i ..(r ′ , h ′ ) and the region region(i, τ ). Since we know that jun(i, τ ) is undefined, it will be the case that k ′ ∈ region(i, τ ), highResult kr (r ′ , h ′ ), h ′ ∼ β h 0 and we can conclude we are in case 2 because we have high(r, h) ∼ ⃗ kr,β high(r ′ , h ′ ). Let i ∈ P P and τ, τ ′ ∈ {Norm} + C s.t. Proof: By induction on k.
• k = 0 we can directly apply case 2 of Lemma I.9 to conclude.
• we suppose the statement is true for a given k and we prove it now for k + 1, let the program point be i 1 . First note that se(i 0 ) ≰ k obs and i 0 ⊢ RT i0 ⇒ rt 1 hold for some rt 1 s.t. rt 1 ⊑ RT i1 , so we have
by case 1 of Lemma I.9. Then, using SOAP2, we have i 1 ∈ region(i, τ ) or i 1 = jun(i, τ ). In the first case, it is sufficient to invoke induction hypothesis on derivation ⟨i 1 , ρ 1 , h 1 ⟩ ↝ m,τ1 ...⟨i k+1 , ρ k+1 , h k+1 ⟩ ↝ m,τ k+1 (r, h) to conclude. The second case is an impossible case because we know that the program satisfies SOAP3 therefore jun(i, τ ) is undefined.
Lemma I.11 (High Branching). Let all method m ′ in P are non-interferent w.r.t. all the policies in Policies Γ (m ′ ). Let m be a method in P , β ∈ L ⇀ L a partial function, s 1 , s 2 ∈ State G and two registers types rt 1 , rt 2 ∈ (R → S) s.t. • iput, aget, and aput. The arguments closely follows that of iget
• throw. There are four cases to consider here : 1) Two same exception. In this case, we know that the exception will be the same, therefore the value for ex will be the same (ex = ρ 1 (r e ) = ρ 2 (r e )), thus giving us ρ
In the case where the exception is uncaught, we know that the value will be the same, that is ρ 1 (r e ), therefore the output will be indistinguishable as well. 2) Two different exceptions, both are caught. We can appeal directly to the transfer rule. We know that the register containing the exception is high, and since the register will now only contains the ex register and it is high, therefore the registers are indistinguishable. After we defined all the lemmas we need, we proceed to the soundness proof, i.e. typable DEX bytecode is noninterferent. Suppose we have β a partial function β ∈ L ⇀ L and ⟨i 0 , ρ 0 , h 0 ⟩, ⟨i (r, h) ∼ ⃗ ka,β ′ (r ′ , h ′ ) and β ⊆ β ′ Proof: Following the proof in the side effect safety, we use induction on the length of method call chain. For the base case, there is no invoke instruction involved (method call chain with length 0). A note about this setting is that we can use lemmas which assume that all the methods are non-interferent since we are not going to call another method. To start the proof in the base case of induction on method call chain length, we use induction on the length of k and k ′ . The base case is when k = k ′ = 0. In this case, we can use case 3 of Lemma I.12. There are several possible cases for the induction step: 1) k > 0 and k ′ = 0: then we can use case 2 of Lemma I.12 to get existence of β ′ ∈ L ⇀ L s.t. 
to conclude. 2) k = 0 and k ′ > 0 is symmetric to the previous case. 3) k > 0 and k ′ > 0. If the next instruction is at the same program point (i 1 = i ′ 1 ) we can conclude using the case 1 of Lemma I.12 and induction hypothesis. Otherwise we will have registers typing rt 1 and rt
Then using case 1 of Lemma I.11 we have high(ρ 1 , RT i1 ) and se is high in region(i 0 , τ ) high(ρ • (r, h) ∼ ⃗ ka,β ′ (r ′ , h ′ ) and we can directly conclude.
After we established the base case, we can then continue to prove the induction on method call chain. In the case where an instruction calls another method, we will have the method non-interferent since they necessarily have shorter call chain length (induction hypothesis).
